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This report is offered on behalf of the Federal Administrative
Law Judges Conference (FALJC), a voluntary professional
association of federal administrative law judges, who perform
judicial functions within the Executive Branch of the Government.
FALJC was organized over 60 years ago for the purpose of
improving the administrative judicial process, presenting educational
programs to enhance the judicial skills of federal administrative law
judges, and representing federal administrative law judges in matters
affecting the administrative judiciary. Our membership includes
judges from virtually every federal agency that employs
administrative law judges. As a result, because of its broad
membership base, FALJC is the only independent organization of
judges that speaks for the entire administrative judiciary. (Many of
our members from the Social Security Administration (SSA) also
belong to an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, the Association of
Administrative Law Judges.)
We offer these comments to assist you, President-Elect Barack
Obama, and your transition team in familiarizing yourselves with
issues relating to federal administrative law judges. We hope that
you will use our organization as a resource, should issues that involve
the administrative judiciary arise in the future.
Federal Administrative Law Judges, also known as "ALJs,"
derive their powers and judicial independence directly from the
Administrative Procedure Act and, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, ALJs are the functional equivalent of federal trial judges.
ALJs are selected competitively from a register of qualified lawyers
currently maintained by the Office of Personnel Management,
through a statutorily mandated, merit-based process. Although ALJs
are federal employees, they are paid through a system separate from
the General Schedule (GS) and Senior Executive Service (SES) and
are neither subject to performance evaluations nor eligible for
bonuses or other monetary awards. There are over 1,300 ALJs
assigned to 31 different agencies, of which the Social Security
Administration (SSA) is by far the largest employer. ALJs try cases
falling into three broad categories: regulatory cases (economic
regulation of rates and services provided by vital industries);
entitlement cases (adjudication of claims based upon disability or
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death of workers under the Social Security Act and other programs);
and enforcement cases (enforcement of statutes and regulations
relating to safety and other requirements). For example, judges from
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission conduct hearings to
ascertain the fairness and reasonableness of utility rates and practices.
In addition, judges from the Department of Agriculture conduct
enforcement proceedings under the Animal Welfare Act, and judges
from the Department of Labor handle a wide variety of cases that
range from adjudicating claims relating to injuries sustained by
government contractors in Iraq to hearing "whistleblower" cases
premised upon retaliation for reporting securities fraud.'
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
ALJs must maintain their judicial independence in order to
perform these essential functions in a fair and impartial manner.
Such independence is a prerequisite to resolving administrative
proceedings in a fair and expeditious manner and to maintaining the
litigants' confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judicial
process. Nonetheless, we have observed recent efforts to undermine
that independence. With those observations in mind, we offer the
following recommendations:
1.
(a) We recommend that you appoint agency heads who will
respect, uphold, and enforce the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) regarding the federal agency
administrative adjudication process. In recent years, agency heads
have been making legislative and administrative efforts to erode (1)
the APA requirement that ALJs preside over APA hearings, and (2)
the APA provisions that ensure the independence of ALJ decision-
making.
(b) We recommend that you oppose and, if necessary, veto
any proposed legislation that would permit individual agencies to
circumvent the ALJ hiring process or otherwise compromise
ALJ independence. During the past year, both the International
Trade Commission and the Federal Trade Commission have sought
1. FALJC, Documents Library: List ofAgency ChiefAdministrative Law
Judges and Designees (Oct. 2008), http://005754d.netsolhost.com/faljc7.html.
to introduce legislation that would have permitted them to
circumvent the ALJ selection process and appoint favored employees
within their own agencies. The Commissioner of the SSA has
proposed legislation that would permit agencies to discipline ALJs
for unproven and ill-defined "offenses," rather than submit such
cases to the Merit System Protection Board for a hearing and
decision.
2. We recommend that you transfer the responsibility for
oversight of the ALJ program from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to a newly created independent agency, the
Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States. In
recent years, the OPM has eliminated the office that was responsible
for such oversight of the ALJ program, and has taken steps to
undermine the independence and caliber of the administrative
judiciary. These steps have included administering the ALJ
candidate exam process in a manner calculated to exclude many of
the most qualified applicants, and advocating ALJ performance
standards in violation of the APA. The Conference would achieve
the goals of (1) maximizing administrative efficiency, (2) ensuring
high standards for ALJ candidates, (3) promoting professionalism,
(4) promoting public confidence in ALJs' judicial independence, and
(5) facilitating Congressional oversight.
3.We recommend that you support and sign remedial legislation
that would allow ALJs to receive all of their earned pay by
removing the cap on ALJ locality payments. This cap prevents
senior ALJs from receiving significant portions of the locality
payments that are supposed to enable these judges to keep pace with
the cost of living in their respective pay localities. Removing the cap
on this critical portion of ALJs' earned pay not only would enable
them to keep up with the cost of living, but also would end the
compression of ALJ pay.
4.We recommend that you support and sign legislation that
would enhance ALJ retirement benefits. A large and increasing
number of ALJs are required to work until advanced old age because
of the need to provide at least 30 years of federal service to receive
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an adequate pension. Improving ALJs' pensions would promote
vigor of the ALJ workforce and would reduce agency costs.
In this report, we provide a discussion of the recommendations
and the issues related to each of them. We stand ready to provide
you with additional information and documentation relating to these
or any other matters of interest or concern. Please contact Judge
Steven Glazer, FALJC President, at 301-332-9214 or
faljc@comcast.net for additional information.
III.RECOMMENDATIONS
A.Preserve and Enforce Administrative Due Process, Including
Judicial Independence ofAdministrative Law Judges
We urge you to appoint agency heads who will respect,
uphold, and enforce the provisions of the APA regarding the
federal agency administrative adjudication process. In recent
years, agency heads have been making legislative and
administrative efforts to erode (1) the APA requirement that
ALJs preside over APA hearings, and (2) the APA provisions
that ensure the independence of ALJ decision-making.
The APA was enacted in 1946 to achieve reasonable uniformity
and fairness of the administrative process for members of the
American public with claims pending before Executive Branch
agencies. The APA includes procedural safeguards that ensure fair
and uniform standards for the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings,
including the merit appointment of ALJs. The APA protections are
intended to ensure that Americans receive full and fair due process
administrative hearings before independent ALJs who make
decisions based only on the evidence in the hearing record and are
made without agency pressure. The APA exists for the protection
and benefit of the parties who appear before federal agencies for
decisions of administrative claims, not for the benefit of the agencies
or the agencies' ALJs.
The APA applies to all federal agency adjudications that are (1)
made after an unfavorable agency determination under it regulations,
and (2) required by statute to be decided on the record after notice
and an opportunity for a hearing. APA ALJs must preside over all
adjudicatory proceedings to which the APA applies, unless the
agency itself presides, i.e., part or all of an agency's commission or
board.
APA provisions that safeguard ALJ independence from undue
agency influence by making ALJs partially independent of their
employing agencies include:
(1) a merit competitive civil service selection process
administered by the OPM, rather than by the agencies who
employ ALJs, to ensure that ALJs are well qualified, fair, and
able to exercise independent judgment in deciding cases without
the influence of agency pressure;
(2) career permanent civil service appointments without a
probationary period;
(3) pay levels that are set by statute and are not based upon
performance;
(4) the requirement of a due process hearing before the Merit
Systems Protection Board before an adverse personnel action,
such as removal, suspension, reduction in grade, reduction in pay,
or a furlough under 31 days, may be taken against an ALJ, which
protects APA adjudications from political intrusion by "at will"
personnel actions by the President or his appointees against ALJs;
(5) a separate chain of supervisors for ALJs from those who
investigate or prosecute cases for the employing agency, which is
a key structural protection of decision maker independence;
(6) a prohibition of performance evaluations;
(7) a prohibition of bonus pay and honorary awards for
accomplishment in the performance of adjudicatory functions;
(8) a prohibition of assignment of duties inconsistent with an
AL's duties as a judge;
(9) a prohibition of ex parte communications with the litigants
including agency officials regarding the facts at issue in a case;
and
(10) the assignment of cases by rotation among the ALJs to the
extent practicable.
Although the APA permits the enactment of statutes that
expressly supersede the APA, it allows only one narrow exception to
who may preside over an APA hearing. An agency is permitted to
use non-ALJ hearing officers or other employees only when the
proposed statute expressly (1) identifies them by a specific job title to
conduct specified classes of proceedings, or (2) authorizes the agency
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to designate a specific officer or employee, or one of a specific class
of officers or employees, to conduct specified classes of proceedings.
Congressional legislative history states that the exception is not
intended to give agencies a loophole to avoid the use of ALJs, but is
intended only to preserve specified statutory hearing officers and, at
the same time, ensure the parties of a fair and impartial procedure.
Congress rarely has authorized non-ALJs to preside over APA
hearings. For example, during the 1970s, Congress authorized non-
ALJs to hear a large backlog of Social Security Act SSI benefit cases,
but converted the non-ALJs to ALJ status a few years later.
Several agencies have attempted to side-step the APA
safeguards during the last few years, including the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), International Trade
Commission (ITC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the SSA.
These include legislative efforts to use non-ALJs to hear and decide
APA cases, and circumvent both the OPM's merit competitive civil
service selection process for ALJs and the requirement of an MSPB
hearing before certain significant adverse personnel actions may be
taken against an ALJ. These efforts are as follows.
First, during 2003, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) within the DHHS, which issues the Medicare regulations and
initial Medicare case determinations, sought Congressional authority
to supervise the Medicare appeals process and used non-ALJs to hear
and decide the appeals of CMS' Medicare determinations. This took
place when the jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals of Medicare
cases was being transferred back to the DHHS from the SSA.
After increased national media attention to the issue, Congress
enacted a Medicare jurisdiction transfer statute that expressly
requires that (1) Medicare appeals be heard and decided by ALJs
appointed pursuant to the APA (as they previously were at SSA), and
(2) Medicare ALJs be placed in an administrative office that reports
directly to the DHHS Secretary in order to have the highest degree of
structural independence of the ALJs as possible within the same
agency from the CMS managers and initial decision makers of the
Medicare program. 2
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff note (2007): transfer of responsibility for Medicare
appeals, P.L. 108-173, Title IX, Subtitle D, § 93 1(a)-(c), 117 Stat. 2396 (Dec. 8,
2003).
Second, during the 110 th Congress, the ITC had a provision
pending before Congress, section 601 of the Trade Enforcement Act
of 2007 (S. 1919) that would allow the ITC to directly hire non-ALJ
hearing officers to conduct APA hearings regarding alleged unfair
import trade practices under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.'
Since the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC has conducted
administrative hearings on the record after notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. Upon the APA's enactment in 1946, these
adjudications also became APA adjudications, which required ALJs
to preside. Since 1975, the Tariff Act expressly has required such
hearings to be held in conformity with the APA.
The ITC asked Congress for authority to hire non-ALJs after the
OPM turned down the ITC's request that the ITC be allowed to select
any ALJ on the candidate register because the ITC wanted ALJs with
technical proficiency in intellectual property law. For over 20 years,
the OPM has stated that the law prohibits an agency from selecting
ALJ register candidates on the basis of agency-related experience, a
practice known as "selective certification." Instead, an agency must
choose new ALJs under the so-called "Rule of Three," meaning that
an agency must choose from the top three judges on the register
regardless of their technical qualifications or experience.
The ITC's bill also would provide its non-ALJs with only some
of the independence protections that ALJs have under the APA,
including: (1) the non-ALJs may be removed from office only for
good cause shown upon a hearing conducted on the record the Merit
Systems Protection Board; (2) they may not be assigned duties
inconsistent with their duties as a judge; (3) there will be no
performance evaluations; (4) pay will not be set based upon
performance, but will be set by statute the same as for ALJs; and (5)
the assignment of cases must be rotated among the decision makers
to the extent practicable or as otherwise provided for in the ITC's
rules.
The ITC bill left out all of the other ALJ safeguards in the APA
that are designed to make ALJs independent in their decision making
from the agencies that employ them, including: (1) a separate chain
of supervisors from those who investigate or prosecute for the
3. Trade Enforcement Act of 2007, S. 1919, 110th Cong. § 601 (2007).
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agency; (2) career permanent civil service appointments without a
probationary period; (3) an MSPB hearing before certain adverse
personnel actions other than removal may be taken, without which
the non-ALJs are vulnerable the same as all other federal employees
under part 752 of OPM's regulations; (4) a prohibition of bonus pay
and honorary awards; (5) a prohibition of ex parte communications
with the litigants including agency officials; and (6) hiring through a
competitive civil service process administered by the OPM, rather
than directly by the employing agency. The ITC directly would hire
its non-ALJs.
The ITC's hiring of several ALJs from other agencies during the
last year demonstrated that the ITC could hire ALJs with acceptable
credentials from other agencies, and without the need to either hire
ALJs from the OPM's candidate list or resort to the direct hire of
non-ALJs. The ALJs hired by the ITC over the years through the
OPM process swiftly have achieved the necessary technical
proficiency to decide unfair import trade practices cases.
Third, during the 1 10 th Congress, the FTC had section 4 of the
Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2008 pending
before Congress that would allow the FTC to selectively certify and
appoint ALJs who have experience with antitrust or trade regulation
litigation and who are familiar with the kinds of economic analysis
associated with such litigation.4
A single independent agency with exclusive government-wide
authority to (1) evaluate and qualify ALJ candidates through a merit
civil service process, (2) maintain a certified register of ALJ
candidates, (3) certify AU candidates from the register to agencies,
and (4) approve transfers of ALJs between agencies ensures that
ALJs are well qualified, fair, and able to exercise independent
judgment in deciding cases without the influence of agency pressure.
This vetting process is a vital public protection of the quality of
newly hired ALJs that should not be left to the agencies that employ
ALJs. However, we also strongly maintain that the OPM no longer
should be involved in the evaluation of ALJ candidates or the
administration of the ALJ program for the reasons stated in section B
below.
4. Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2008, S. 2831, 110th
Cong. § 4 (2008).
Selective certification casts doubt on the independence of ALJs
by allowing agencies to give undue preference to candidates who are
or have been employed by those agencies under the guise of "related
experience." Selective certification usurps the OPM ALJ hiring
process by lowering the standards of administrative judicial
experience and proficiency by letting agencies hire ALJ candidates
who have lower overall ratings than other candidates who have gone
through the OPM's exhaustive qualifying and certification process.
We firmly believe that a major strength of the ALJ corps is
derived from the diverse professional backgrounds of its members.
The experience of the ITC, FTC, and numerous other agencies
demonstrates that an otherwise qualified ALJ can acquire the
knowledge needed to adjudicate technical issues in relatively short
order. ALJs have a long history of effectively evaluating technical
evidence, including the testimony of expert witnesses. Selective
certification may also circumvent veteran's preference.
Finally, last August, the SSA Commissioner, through the Office
of Management & Budget, circulated a draft bill to the agencies that
employ ALJs. The bill would amend 5 U.S.C. § 7521 of the APA to
allow all agencies, in many instances, to immediately "discipline"
ALJs who work for them without a prior finding of good cause
established by the Merit Systems Protection Board.5
Instances for which discipline would be allowed include
whenever an ALJ is (1) indicted or convicted of an imprisonable
crime; (2) disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; (3) found
by a court or administrative tribunal "to have discriminated against
an individual in a protected class, showed disrespect to an individual
in a protected class, committed discriminatory physical or verbal
conduct against a protected class member, or committed sexual
harassment;" or (4) "indicted or convicted of a misdemeanor
involving fraud, theft, assault, physical violence, prostitution,
solicitation, sexual misconduct, or an offense involving narcotics or
is found civilly liable for engaging in one or more of these activities."
5. FALJC, Documents Library: Michael J. Astrue, SSA Comm'r, draft bill,
Civil Service Reform Act Amendments of 2009,
http://005754d.netsolhost.com/faljc7.html.
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The proposal vaguely calls for "discipline" for certain types of
offenses but does not explain what form that "discipline" may take.
The proposal's allowance of an agency to discipline an ALJ for being
indicted without a conviction permits agency reprisals when no crime
has been proven. Allowing agency action to be based upon a finding
of disrespect toward an individual in a protected class permits the
possibility of retaliatory complaints by litigants unhappy with case
outcomes to be used by agencies for actions against ALJs.
As is stated above, the APA requires a due process hearing before
the MSPB before an adverse personnel action, such as removal,
suspension, reduction in grade, reduction in pay, or a furlough under
31 days, may be taken against an ALJ. This provision, 5 U.S.C. §
7521, protects APA adjudications from political intrusion by "at will"
personnel actions by the President or his appointees against ALJs.
The current law allows only three exceptions to the requirement that
an agency show good cause before the MSPB before firing or
otherwise disciplining an ALJ: a suspension or removal in the
interests of national security under 5 U.S.C. § 7532; a reduction-in-
force action under 5 U.S.C. § 3502; or any action initiated by the
Special Counsel under 5 U.S.C. § 1215 for (1) committing a
prohibited personnel practice, (2) violating a law, rule or regulation,
or engaging in other conduct that is within the jurisdiction of the
Special Counsel under 5 U.S.C. § 1216, or (3) knowingly and
willfully violating an MSPB order. 6
We strongly oppose this proposed legislation. The proposal is an
attempt to destroy one of the most important features of the ALJs'
decisional independence in the APA: protection from agency
discipline or dismissal without accountability to the MSPB.
We urge you to preserve and enforce the APA, including the
judicial independence of ALJs, by not signing the proposed
legislation from the ITC, FTC, and SSA, or any similar
legislation that is in derogation of the APA.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2009).
B. Create an Independent Agency to Assume the OPM's Oversight
Responsibilities for the Administrative Law Judges Program
We urge you to transfer the responsibility for the ALJ
program from the OPM to a newly created independent agency,
the Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States.
Currently, the responsibility for the testing, merit selection, and
appointment of federal administrative law judges, and the
maintenance of a register of qualified ALJs, lies with the OPM.
However, OPM has failed to adequately service the agencies and
judges under its mandate. Beginning in 2003, the OPM
systematically has adopted or advocated policies that serve to both
undermine the independence of the administrative judiciary and
reduce the quality and caliber of ALJs on the register.
In 2003, the OPM eliminated the office that, for many years, was
responsible for the testing, selection, and appointment of ALJs by
transferring these functions to various OPM divisions without
coordination between them. This hampered interaction between the
OPM and ALJs. Since then, the OPM has taken the position that
ALJs are no different from other federal employees and should be
covered by a "pay for performance" system that measures
performance by agency (i.e., political) goals. If implemented, OPM's
position would result in inappropriate agency influence over the
functions performed by ALJs and a consequent lack of independence.
Performance reviews of ALJs are prohibited by the APA.
The OPM's elimination of the ALJ office also was accompanied
by the OPM's efforts to reduce its own accountability in the ALJ
selection process. From 1998 to 2004, agencies generally were
unable to hire new judges from the ALJ register because of pending
litigation.
The OPM issued its final rule in March 2007, which eliminated
OPM Examination Announcement No. 318 regarding the ALJ exam
process. In establishing a new exam process, the OPM replaced the
criteria for appointment of ALJs with vague criteria in the regulations
and removed the requirement for litigation experience from the ALJ
announcement. Although in the past, ALJs were required to be
senior attorneys with significant trial or appellate experience, the
register now includes significant numbers of attorney-writers
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currently employed by the Social Security Administration who do not
have significant litigation experience.
The OPM's reduction in ALJ candidate qualification criteria has
been coupled with the OPM's tactic of keeping the ALJ exam open
for brief periods of time, which has made it difficult for private sector
attorneys to apply. After the March 2007 final rule went into effect,
the ALJ exam was opened once in 2007 for the earlier of either (1)
two weeks from the opening date, or (2) the end of the date on which
the 1 2 5 0 th completed application was received. The latest vacancy
announcement opened on July 30, 2008, and was set to close on
either (1) the end of August 13, 2008, or (2) the end of the date on
which the 600,h completed application was submitted, whichever
came first. Not surprisingly, the window of opportunity in both
instances closed shortly after the opening dates: five days later in
2007 and only one day later in 2008. Applicants who work zealously
to complete the lengthy application and submit it to the OPM before
the expiration of the already shortened two-week closing date run the
risk of having their applications rejected in favor of those submitted
by less qualified but quicker applicants. This system is not only
arbitrary and capricious, it is utterly wasteful of applicant resources
and discourages many otherwise highly-qualified applicants from
even trying to apply. This "race to the mailbox" method devalues the
application process, but has been in use ever since the OPM issued its
March 2007 final rule.
In sum, the OPM no longer is a proponent of the administrative
judiciary. Instead, the OPM , has sought to undermine ALJs
independence and downgrade ALJs' level of experience and
competence. Further, the OPM has failed to perform the important
role of ombudsman for the ALJ program.
To correct these deficiencies, we advocate the creation of a new
independent agency, the Administrative Law Judge Conference
of the United States, which would be responsible for the functions
that the OPM has been performing, or should have been
performing, as proposed by the American Bar Association in 20057
and a bill filed in Congress in 2000.8 The Administrative Law Judge
7. ABA House of Delegates Res. No. 106a and Report (August 2005).
8. Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States Act, H.R. 5177,
106th Cong. (2000).
Conference of the United States specifically would assume all duties
with respect to administrative law judges currently mandated to the
OPM, including the testing, selection, and appointment of ALJs, the
maintenance of an ALJ register, and overseeing the ALJ program.
The Conference may also assume additional responsibilities for the
purpose of improving the administrative hearing process, including
reviewing the rules of procedure and rules of evidence, adopting
measures to ensure compliance with ethical standards, and reporting
agency compliance with the APA. We believe that, as was stated by
the ABA, the Conference would achieve the following goals: (1)
maximizing administrative efficiency; (2) ensuring high
standards of ALJ candidates; (3) promoting professionalism; (4)
promoting public confidence; and (5) facilitating Congressional
oversight.
C. Allow Administrative Law Judges to Receive All of Their Earned
Pay by Removing the Cap on Their Locality Payments
Administrative Law Judges do not receive all of their earned
pay.
We urge you to support and sign remedial legislation that
would allow ALJs to receive all of their earned pay by removing
the cap on ALJ locality-based comparability payments (locality
payments). Removing the locality payments cap would end pay
compression and permit ALJs' pay to keep pace with the cost of
living in their pay localities.
THE ALJ PAY STRUCTURE: The two basic elements of ALJ
statutory compensation are basic pay and the locality payments.
There are three levels of basic pay for ALJs: (1) AL-1, for Chief
Judges of major agencies; (2) AL-2, for other Chief Judges and all
Deputy Chief Judges; and (3) AL-3, for the remaining judges.9 The
statute prescribes six levels of basic pay for AL-3 judges, ranging
from AL-3A to AL-3F. AL-3 judges move from the AL-3A level to
the AL-3F level over a period of seven years.' 0 ALJ basic pay rates
9. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (b)(1)(A).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(1)(B).
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are various percentages of the pay rate for Executive Level (EL) IV
employees. 11
Locality payments are additions to basic pay that are calculated as
a percentage of basic pay. Locality payments are necessary to
provide a federal employee with total pay comparable to that of a
non-federal employee who is performing the same level of work in
the same pay locality. 12 Locality payments enable federal
employees, including ALJs, to keep up with the cost of living in their
pay localities.' 3 According to OPM figures, the locality payments
for 2008 for the 32 pay localities currently designated range from
13.18% to 32.53% of basic pay.
THE PROBLEM: Unfortunately, ALJ total pay, basic pay plus
the locality payments, currently may not exceed the pay rate for EL
111.14 For years, the pay cap has prevented ALJ pay from keeping
pace with the cost of living for the majority of ALJs.
The pay cap also serves to compress ALJ pay. The ALJs who
have reached the statutory EL III ceiling include: all AL-I and AL-2
judges; AL3-F judges in 27 of the 32 pay localities; AL3-E judges in
9 of the 32 pay localities; and even AL3-D judges in the San Jose/San
Francisco/Oakland pay locality. We estimate that, in 2009, the
remaining five of the 32 pay localities will hit the pay ceiling for AL-
3Fs, and that six additional localities will run up against the ceiling
for AL-3Es.
The compression of ALJ salaries is unfair to the most senior and
accomplished ALJs. For example, the Chief ALJ for the Social
Security Administration, who currently is responsible for managing
over 1,100 ALJs throughout the nation, currently receives the same
salary received by relatively junior AL-3D Social Security judges in
San Francisco. The application of the pay cap to include locality
payments defeats the intent of the ALJ pay statute, which is to reward
the most accomplished and senior ALJs by providing them higher
basic pay. The pay cap rescinds the higher pay by denying the most
accomplished and senior ALJs all but a fraction of their locality
adjustment.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(1)(C).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5302(6), 5304.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 5304(h). This statute addresses ALJ locality adjustments.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 5304(g)(2)(A).
The problems from ALJs not receiving all of their earned
pay, pay compression and pay levels that do not keep pace with
the cost of living, are particularly acute in high-cost areas.
THE REMEDY: Legislation that amends 5 U.S.C. § 5304(g) to
exclude ALJ locality payments from the pay cap would permit ALJs to
receive all of their earned pay, which would eliminate pay compression
and permit ALJs' pay to keep pace with the cost of living. Such an
amendment would not raise ALJs' basic pay. The amendment would
do no more than permit ALJs to receive all of their earned pay by
removing the cap on locality payments. A revised 5 U.S.C. § 5304(g)
that would exclude ALJ locality payments would read as follows (the
amendments are in bold). 15
§5304(g)
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), comparability
payments may not be paid at a rate which, when added to the rate
of basic pay otherwise payable to the employee involved, would
cause the total to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level IV
of the Executive Schedule.
(2) The applicable maximum under this subsection shall be level
III of the ExecutiveSchedulefor-
(A) positions under subparagraphs (A) and (C) of subsection
(h)(1);
(B) any positions under subsection (h)(1)(D) which the
President may determine.
(3) This subsection shall not apply to a position under
subparagraph (B) of subsection (h)(1).
FALJC supports the enactment of the Federal Judicial Salary
Restoration Act (S. 1638, H.R. 3753), which would remediate the
long-standing salary erosion experienced by the Article III judiciary
with a salary increase and automatic annual pay adjustments.
D. Enhance Retirement Benefits for Administrative Law Judges
A large and increasing number of ALJs are required to work
until advanced old age because of the lack of an adequate pension
until at least 30 years of federal service is earned.
15. FALJC, Documents Library: draft bill, Administrative Law Judges Locality
Payments ReliefAct of 2008, http://005754d.netsolhost.com/faljc7.html.
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We urge you to support and sign legislation that would
enhance ALJ retirement benefits. Improving ALJs' pensions
would promote the vigor of the ALJ workforce and would reduce
agency costs.
THE FEDERAL DEFINED PENSION BENEFIT
STRUCTURE: Administrative Law Judges currently are covered
by the same retirement systems as other federal civilian employees:
the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal
Employee Retirement System (FERS).
CSRS allows for an immediate full annuity under three
circumstances that are applicable to all employees, including ALJs:
(1) upon reaching age 55 and completing 30 years of service;16 (2)
upon reaching age 60 and completing 20 years of service;1 7 and (3)
upon reaching age 62 and completing 5 years of service.' 8
A federal civilian employee enrolled in CSRS who retires will
receive an annuity that is calculated as follows: (.015 or 1.5%) x (first
5 years of service) x (average pay) + (.0175 or 1.75%) x (next 5 years
of service) x (average pay) + (.02 or 2%) x (all years and months of
service over 10 years) x (average pay). 5 U.S.C. § 8339(a). For
example, a CSRS employee with a 30 year career would receive a
pension equal to 56.25% of average pay. "Average pay" is the
largest annual rate resulting from averaging an employee's or
Member's rates of basic pay, including locality pay, that were in
effect over any 3 consecutive years of federal service. 
19
The newer FERS allows for an immediate full annuity upon
retirement under three circumstances that are applicable to all
employees, including ALJs: (1) upon reaching the Minimum
Retirement Age specified in 5 U.S.C. § 8412(h), which ranges from
55 to 57 depending on one's birth date, and completing 30 years of
service;20 (2) upon reaching age 60 and completing 20 years of
16. 5 U.S.C. § 8336(a).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 8336(b).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 8336(f).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331(4), 8401(3).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 8412(a).
service; 21 and (3) upon reaching age 62 and completing 5 years of
service.22
A federal civilian employee enrolled in FERS who retires will
receive an annuity that is calculated as follows: (.01 or 1%) x (all
years of service) x (average pay).23 If a FERS employee retires at or
over age 62 with at least 20 years of countable federal service, the
employee's annuity is calculated as follows: (.011 or 1.1%) x (all
years of service) x (average pay). 24 For example, a FERS employee
with a 30 year career would receive a pension equal to only 30%
of average pay or, if the employee retires at or over age 62, 33%
of average pay.
THE PROBLEM: The lack of an adequate pension benefit until
at least 30 years of federal service is earned is causing a large and
increasing number of ALJs to work into advanced old age because:
(1) they cannot afford a markedly lower standard of living for
themselves and their families;
(2) they are attempting to increase the value of the survivor's
pension to which their spouses would be entitled;
(3) an increasing majority of ALJs are in the FERS, which
provides a much smaller pension than the older CSRS;
(4) an increasing number of ALJs are not career federal
employees and enter federal service later in their careers; and
(5) they cannot otherwise accrue a sufficient number of years of
service to be entitled to a pension equal to a percent of average
pay that is average for other retiring federal civilian employees.
Based upon the OPM statistics, the average age at voluntary
retirement of federal civilian employees gradually has fallen as the
length of service gradually has risen. Contrary to the trend in the
federal civilian workforce, the average age at voluntary retirement for
ALJs is rising as the average length of service at retirement is
gradually declining. At retirement, the average AU is eight to ten
years older than the average federal civilian employee. However, the
averages do not tell the whole story of the advanced ages till
21. 5 U.S.C. § 8412(b).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 8412(c).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 8415(a).
24. 5 U.S.C. §§8415(a), 8415(g).
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which many ALJs must work to acquire the 30 years of federal
service that is average for the federal civilian workforce.
Although the contribution of the more senior members of the AU
corps to federal administrative adjudication is of high caliber, over
25% of the currently employed ALJs will have to work until or
past age 75 to achieve a federal pension based on 30 years of
federal service. This is more than double the 12% of ALJs who
retired during 1995-1999 at age 75 or above. Another 25% of the
currently employed ALJs will have to work until ages 70-74 to
achieve 30 years of federal service. SSA ALJs, who are over 80%
of the AU work force, have an average of nearly a decade less of
federal service accrued by any given age than the average federal
civilian employee. Although about half of ALJs will have to work
until or past age 70 to achieve an average federal pension, federal
employees at or over the age of 70 are unusual. Federal employees
over the age of 75 are rare.
THE REMEDY: Legislation that would increase the rate of
pension benefit accrual will result in (1) a normal rate of
turnover from timely retirements by ALJs before they reach
advanced old age, and (2) a dignified retirement at reasonable
ages for virtually all ALJs. An enhanced pension benefit would
serve as an incentive for ALJs to retire earlier by taking years off the
length of time it takes ALJs' pensions to reach the percent of average
pay that is average for civilian federal employee pensions.
An enhanced pension benefit would serve as an incentive to ALJs
to retire sooner by taking years off the length of time it takes ALJs'
pensions to reach the percent of average pay that is average for
civilian federal employee pensions.
The resulting reduction of the average age at retirement of ALJs
also will reduce the AU payroll, since younger ALJs often have not
yet reached the top of the seven-year pay-step ladder. Once an AU
retires, the agencies no longer are paying the AU's compensation
and the AU's pension is paid by the CSRS and FERS Retirement
Fund, which is administered by the OPM.
Therefore, improving ALJs' pensions would promote the vigor
of the ALJ workforce for the benefit of the American public and
would reduce agency costs.
All of the employee groups who have received a CSRS and FERS
annuity enhancement receive the same increased annual pension
benefit accrual rate as the Members of Congress and Congressional
staff: 2.5% in CSRS and 1.7% in FERS. The enhanced groups
include many federal law enforcement employees and, in CSRS, four
groups of federal judicial officers: (1) U.S. Bankruptcy Judges; (2)
U.S. Magistrates; (3) U.S. Court of Federal Claims Judges; and (4)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Judges.
Under the proposed legislation, 25 an ALJ who voluntarily retires
under a currently existing CSRS or FERS immediate annuity option,
and who also has at least 10 years of ALJ service, would receive (1)
the entire pension benefit accrued under the currently existing CSRS
and/or FERS annuity rules, but with (2) an increased pension accrual
rate of 2.5% per year in CSRS or 1.7% in FERS of the ALJs' average
pay for all years of ALJ service in CSRS and up to 20 years of ALJ
service in FERS. Up to five years of countable military service also
would be enhanced.
The ALJ pension bill also would provide ALJs with two new
immediate annuity options in CSRS and FERS: (1) a full annuity
upon separation from service after becoming 60 years of age and
completing 10 years of ALJ service; and (2) a reduced annuity upon
voluntary early retirement before age 60 and after completing 10
years of ALJ service. An ALJ is not required to meet any of the
currently existing CSRS or FERS immediate annuity options to be
entitled to an ALJ annuity.
The ALJ pension reform bill is a very low cost bill based upon
the CBO Cost Estimate for the first version of the bill, H.R. 2316,
which was filed in 2003. Because the CBO does not take payroll
savings into account, the reduced ALJ payroll from the
acceleration effect of the pension bill on the ALJs' retirement
would reduce the cost of the bill to the agencies below the cost
that was estimated by the CBO.
25. Administrative Law Judges Retirement Act of 2008, H.R. 6706, 110th
Cong. (2008). The bill needs changes to bring it into line with the provisions for
Members of Congress, Congressional staff, and other enhanced groups. However,
the annuity accrual rates are the same.
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Respectfully submitted,
Judge Steven Glazer,
FALJC President
301-332-9214
faljc@comcast.net
